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SUMMARY
Provincial budgets may normally make for dry reading, but in Alberta’s case, there is plenty of
suspense lurking inside the pages — and that’s not necessarily a good thing.
Your average family may know certain things about balancing a budget: keeping spending
roughly in line with income; not relying on volatile, unpredictable income streams to cover
expenses; and not leaving the kids with an inheritance of significant debt. But look at how
Alberta has been managing its budget in the last decade, and it is obvious that the provincial
government is breaking a lot of the financial management rules that most Albertans are
disciplined enough to live by at home.
A clear way to get a sense of how the Alberta government has managed its finances is by
analyzing how much provincial program spending relies on depleting provincial savings, either in
the form of savings funds or non-renewable resource deposits, such as oil and gas. By 2011,
Alberta’s “Budget Gap” had grown to almost the same level it was in 1993, when the province
was forced to adopt wrenching budget cuts in order to close what had become a yawning gap
between revenue and costs amounting to $4,000 in spending for every man, woman and child
in the province. 
This paper suggests there are three key questions that should be posed to our government and
to any political party seeking to represent our interests as our government:
1. How tolerant are they of annual deficits? Do they advocate a strategy of relatively lower levels
of government spending and/or higher tax rates, so as to avoid deficits no matter the state
of the economy? Or will they tolerate deficits during economic slowdowns to enable higher
levels of spending and/or lower tax rates?
2. To what extent are they willing to trust the payment of health-care costs and the costs of
education and social assistance to oil and gas royalties as opposed to taxation?
3. How, exactly, does one define investments in social infrastructure; investments that can be
funded by borrowing or by spending non-renewable resource royalties? What limits should be
put on borrowing to fund such expenditures?
† The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments of the anonymous referees.
INTRODUCTION
Government budgets rarely threaten to push the publications of Stephen King or J.K. Rowling
off the bestseller list. That is because, to most people, budgets are as dry as dust. That’s
unfortunate because government budgets are wonderfully informative. They report on past
successes and failures of government policy and they document our hopes and aspirations as
they are understood by the people we elect to represent our interests. Government budgets tell
us where we have been and where we are heading. They hint at what our taxes might look like
in the future and how public services — from health to education to social assistance — might
evolve over time. Government budgets are important for voters to understand, but few voters do. 
While economists don’t mind reading what others consider to be dry as dust — which is fair
since economists write much of it — almost everyone else finds trying to understand
government budgets enough of a challenge that they do not even bother to try. Yet for the
democratic process to work effectively, it is important that governments make what is in their
budgets easy to understand so that voters can make informed choices. Unfortunately, the need
for governments to respect accounting conventions makes it difficult for taxpayers — those who
must ultimately pay the government’s bills — to wade their way through balance sheets,
reconciliation statements and budgetary addenda.  What is needed is someone to translate what
is said in the budget into a simple-to-understand description. That’s the purpose of this note.
In what follows, I will describe, as simply and as fairly as I can, the direction in which the most
recent budget of the Government of Alberta — released February 9, 2012 — suggests our
government’s finances are moving. A lot of niggling details will be swept under the carpet
because I will be painting a picture using broad strokes. But that’s okay, because the details are
less important than a broad understanding of where the budget suggests we have been and where
we are heading.
THE BIG PICTURE
All governments face a budget constraint in relating spending to revenue. Let’s start by
separating Total Spending and Total Revenue into the smaller components that comprise them. I’ll
start with Total Revenue.
Provincial governments have a number of sources of revenue, the most important of which is
taxation. There are, of course, many forms of taxation. Provincial governments tax the incomes
of individuals and corporations; they impose so-called “sin taxes” on our purchases of alcohol
and tobacco; they tax us when we buy gasoline; they tax us on the value of property we own;
and they tax us because we try to earn a living (payroll taxes). Other provincial governments,
though not Alberta’s, impose a tax equal to a percentage of most things we buy (a sales tax).
Rather than delve into these details we will just refer to all such forms of revenue as Taxation. 
The federal government imposes its own array of taxes on all Canadians and then transfers some
of that revenue to provincial governments. These intergovernmental transfers arrive in a variety
of forms. There are transfers tied to specific programs and transfers that the provincial
government can use more or less as they please. Again, these details need not concern us and so
we will refer to all such transfers from the federal government as Federal Transfers. 
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Provincial governments also receive revenue in the form of the income they earn on the
financial assets they own. The government of Alberta holds the financial assets it owns in a
number of savings funds. The most notable of these are the Heritage Fund, designed to act as a
savings fund for the benefit of future generations, and the Sustainability Fund, intended to act
as a kind of rainy day fund to absorb the budgetary consequences of unexpected events. The
list also includes endowment funds intended to produce a stream of investment income to be
used to fund medical research and research in science and engineering. I’ll refer to all these
sources of revenue as Investment Income.
Many provinces enjoy still another source of revenue; revenue realized as the result of the
production and sale of non-renewable resources. The name given to these revenues — non-
renewable resource revenues — accurately describes what these revenues represent; the
revenue gained from the sale of natural resources that are in finite (non-renewable) supply. The
government of Alberta enjoys the benefit of receiving a large amount of revenue from this
source. It comes in the form of royalties (a form of tax) that the government imposes on the
production of natural gas, crude oil, bitumen, and coal, and in the form of land sales and leases.
I will refer to all of these sources of revenue as non-renewable resource revenue or NRR for short.
A provincial government’s Total Revenue, then, can be summarized as being the sum of all of
the items described above. That is:
Total Revenue = Taxation + Federal Transfers + Investment Income + NRR
Now let’s turn to Total Spending. This is much easier as there are only two broad categories of
spending that provinces do. Most of the spending that governments do is called Program
Spending. This is what the government spends on goods and services and what it transfers to
people and to other levels of government. The “Big Three” areas of spending for any
provincial government are health, education and social services, in that order. The other part of
Total Spending will be discussed below. This is the cost of paying interest on borrowed funds,
what we call Debt Service. Total Spending, then, is given by:
Total Spending = Program Spending + Debt Service.
For reasons we discuss below it is difficult for governments to always equate Total Revenue to
Total Spending. If Total Spending exceeds Total Revenue, the imbalance is referred to as a
Deficit. In this case the government can fund the difference between spending and revenue by
borrowing or by selling financial assets. When they borrow, governments sell government-
issued bonds to us. When they raise revenue in this fashion they must, of course, pay us
interest on the amount they borrow. This payment of interest, what is called Debt Service,
appeared above in our description of Total Spending. The other thing governments can do
when they find their revenues are insufficient to pay for their spending is to sell some of their
financial assets. The government of Alberta has been doing a lot of this lately by selling the
financial assets it holds in its Sustainability Fund, something we will talk more about later.
When a government sells financial assets, it of course reduces the amount of Investment
Income it receives.
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3There are occasions when the amount of revenue collected by provincial governments is more
than sufficient to pay for their Total Spending. In these cases the government is said to realize a
Surplus. A Surplus requires that the government make a decision regarding what to do with
these excess funds. One possibility is to repay funds it previously borrowed from us and so
reduce Debt Service. A second possibility is to buy new financial assets and so earn additional
Investment Income.
Deficits and Surpluses arise because of an imbalance between Total Spending on the one hand
and Total Revenue on the other. Thus we can write:
Deficit/Surplus = Total Spending — Total Revenue
where the difference between Total Spending and Total Revenue is referred to as a Deficit or a
Surplus depending on whether the imbalance is positive or negative. Over time, a Deficit
causes Debt Service to increase (if the government borrows), or causes Investment Income to
decrease (if the government sells financial assets). Over time a Surplus causes Debt Service to
decrease (if the government repays old debt), or causes Investment Income to increase (if the
government purchases new financial assets). When we think of Deficits and Surpluses we
should understand that they are two sides of the same coin.
All of this suggests that a full statement of the government’s budget can be written as: 
Deficit/Surplus = (Program Spending + Debt Service) 
— (Taxation + Federal Transfers + Investment Income + NRR).
This big picture description of the government’s budget is built on simple ideas that any
household budgeter can relate to. Spending must be paid for. If income is insufficient to pay
our bills, we run a deficit. In this case we must either borrow and add to our debt, or eat into
our savings by selling assets. If income is more than sufficient to pay our bills, we run a
surplus. In this case we can either repay old debts or add to our savings by purchasing new
assets. The government is just like us when it comes to its annual budgeting exercise.
DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY
Governments must deal with the same problem we all must deal with: our budgets can only
reflect our best guesses about an uncertain future. Sometimes income will be higher than
expected, sometimes lower. The same is true for spending. Unexpected expenses arise and
when they do, we must deal with them. Always maintaining a balanced budget — that is,
always exactly equating our spending to our income — is near impossible. All of us deal with
this uncertainty. We do so by using our savings or by drawing on our line of credit. If spending
is unexpectedly larger than income, we can eat into our savings account or we can draw on our
credit and take on debt. On the other hand, if spending is unexpectedly less than income, we
can take the opportunity to add to our savings or repay debt.1
1 A household can also respond to minor fluctuations in income by foregoing “movie night” this month, or by
explaining to the kids the fun to be had on a “stay-cation.” In this way, a family can avoid dipping into savings or
increasing borrowing. Governments have some scope for responding in this way too, but most provincial spending,
in areas like health care and education for example, are not the sort where we would like to see very much in the way
of fluctuations.
The government deals with uncertainty in exactly these ways too. If spending is unexpectedly
large, the government either eats into its savings or draws on its credit to borrow. If spending is
unexpectedly less than income, the government adds to its savings or repays debt.
The government of Alberta’s line of credit is with world financial markets. The government of
Alberta has an excellent credit rating and, as a consequence, it can borrow money at attractive
rates of interest. If the government needs to borrow, it has no trouble doing so. Borrowing
does, of course, have implications for future budgets, because the government will need to pay
more by way of Debt Service.  
Should spending exceed its other sources of revenue, another option open to the government is
that it can run down its savings. For this purpose, the Alberta government has established its
Sustainability Fund. The Sustainability Fund is where the government parks savings that it may
need on short notice, to fund revenue shortfalls. According to the budget released in February
2012, the Sustainability Fund should now contain about $3.7 billion. That’s down from $7.4
billion this time last year and down from $11.2 billion in March 2011. 
The uncertainty faced by governments stems from the fact that the economy suffers unexpected
events that cause fluctuations in income and employment; what is commonly referred to as the
business cycle. An economic contraction causes tax revenue to fall and spending on things like
social assistance to increase. If the government’s budget was formerly in balance, it falls into
deficit during a contraction and it must either borrow or dip into savings. An economic
expansion does the opposite. If the budget was formerly in balance, it moves into surplus
during an expansion. The government can now either add to its savings or reduce its debt.
The figure below offers a stylistic representation of changes to the government’s budget
imbalance as it moves through a business cycle. It shows three alternative ways of dealing with
the budgetary effects of the cycle. The government can choose which of these outcomes it
obtains by choosing levels of spending and taxation.
The black wavy line shows the implication of the government never allowing a budget deficit
to occur. To avoid a deficit, the surplus realized in favourable economic conditions must be
large so that the same tax rates and spending programs produce no worse than a balanced
budget during unfavourable economic conditions. This is the approach to budgeting adopted by
the government led by premier Ralph Klein in the mid-1990s.
Avoiding a deficit in this way has two key implications. The first is that the government will
either save or reduce outstanding debt in each and every year. The second implication of
budgeting in this way is that it requires the government set tax rates higher, or design spending
programs to be less generous, than would be necessary if it allowed for deficits to occur. 
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ALTERNATIVE BUDGET POLICIES
To see that this is true, suppose the government were more tolerant of deficits. One possibility
is a budgeting strategy favoured by some economists and represented by the red wavy line.
With this approach smaller budget surpluses would be enjoyed during the expansionary part of
the cycle and deficits would be endured during the contractionary part of the cycle. Appropriate
setting of tax rates and appropriate design of spending programs could cause the surpluses to
balance the deficits, and so could, on average, produce a balanced budget. If the government
were tolerant of deficits in this way, tax rates would be lower, or spending more generous, than
in the case described by the black line. 
Like all budgeting strategies, that of the Klein government (represented by the black wavy
line) involved both good news and bad news. The good news was that the strategy enabled the
government to very quickly pay off its net debt.2 The bad news is that the strategy required
keeping spending lower than would otherwise have been necessary.3
The budgeting strategy represented by the red wavy line demands a tolerance for deficits. As
the diagram shows, during periods of slower-than normal-growth, the government budget falls
into relatively large deficits. During these periods, the government must be tolerant of taking
on debt or tolerant of running down savings. The amount of debt taken on, or the amount of
savings used up by this strategy is identified by the sum of the areas in light blue and red dots.
Adopters of this strategy need to be confident that faster-than-normal economic growth will
come along to produce surpluses equal to the amount identified by the area filled with red
vertical lines. The hope is that the value of the surpluses enjoyed during periods of faster-than-
normal growth (the area identified by the red vertical lines) will offset the value of the deficits
suffered during periods of slower-than-normal growth (the sum of the areas in blue and in red
dots). In this way the surpluses will enable the repayment of the debt accrued earlier or the
replacement of the savings used up.
2
“Net debt” is a bit of jargon that is required if what I am saying is to be strictly accurate. All governments own
financial assets and carry debt. This is necessary for many reasons, one of which is that the receipt of tax revenue
does not always arrive on the same day that expenditures must be paid for. A government’s net debt — or, what is the
same thing, the value of its net financial assets — is the balance between the value of gross financial assets and the
value of gross debt. By sometime in fiscal year 2000, the Klein government had reduced gross debt to a level equal
to the value of the government’s financial assets. Its net debt, therefore, was zero in that year. 







Faster than normal growth Slower than normal growth
Getting the “red line” strategy exactly right is tricky business. Many economists argue that it is
best to err on the side of setting tax rates somewhat higher — or keeping spending somewhat
less generous — than this, so as to take on less debt (or eat up less savings) during periods of
slower-than-normal economic growth. Such a strategy is represented by the blue wavy line.
During periods of slower-than-normal economic growth, the amount of new debt taken on —
or the amount of savings used up — is identified by the blue area. Over the full course of a
business cycle, this strategy leaves debt somewhat smaller (or savings somewhat higher) than
at the beginning of the cycle.
The budgeting strategy identified by the blue wavy line is a compromise in that it shaves off a
bit of the good news associated with the red line strategy (tax rates need to be higher or
spending less generous with the blue strategy) but also shaves off a bit of the bad news (the
blue strategy requires less debt to be taken on or less savings to be used up). 
To implement the budgeting strategy that yields the red or the blue wavy line, a government
must be willing to take on debt or to dig into savings during periods of slower-than-normal
economic growth. In recent years, the government of Alberta has chosen to dig into savings
rather than draw on its line of credit with world financial markets. It has done so, presumably,
because it wants to avoid the consequences of borrowing, namely, increased Debt Service
costs. Rather than do that, the government of Alberta has instead eaten into savings held in the
Sustainability Fund. By doing so, it reduces Investment Income. 
The preference for financing deficits with borrowing, as opposed to drawing down savings, is
not at all clear. From a purely economic point of view, the preference depends on the rate of
return that can be expected on savings versus the rate of interest the government must pay on
borrowing. Households face the same sort of choice when deciding whether to buy a new car
with savings or with borrowing; it depends on the rates of interest earned on savings as
opposed to borrowing. If savings are earning eight per cent, but the car purchase can be
financed at three per cent, most households quite sensibly choose to borrow. Economists find it
shocking that the choice governments make on this question might reflect considerations other
than these, but it is likely true nonetheless. I suspect that the politics of incurring debt differs
from the politics of running down savings, and this may explain the government’s preference
for the latter. But I’m an economist, not a political scientist, and so I probably should not
venture very far in that direction.4
This discussion of how governments can deal with uncertainty has made some simple points
that, again, households can easily relate to: the future is uncertain and as a result, so are
spending commitments and revenue plans. Whether to deal with uncertainty by digging into
savings or by borrowing is a choice that ought to be made by comparing rates of return on
savings versus the cost of borrowing. Borrowing means having to make interest payments,
while digging into savings means forgoing the interest earned on savings. Unless interest rates
4 Still, it is interesting to have some idea of these relative rates of return. The Sustainability Fund held an average of
$9,327 million in fiscal year 2011/12. In that year, the government received $495 million in interest from the
Sustainability Fund. That means it earned an average rate of return equal to 5.3 per cent. The federal government can
currently sell bonds with a 10-year date to maturity by promising to pay an interest rate of about 2.2 per cent. The
government of Alberta typically needs to pay more than what the federal government pays. An interest rate of three
per cent would be a good guess.
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on these options differ by a noticeable amount, it’s six of one and a half-dozen of the other.
Finally, moving from one budgeting strategy to another reflects choices about levels of
spending versus levels of income (or, if you are the government, taxation). Moving from the
black to the blue to the red budgeting strategy involves increasing spending without a matching
increase in income. As all households know, and as the figure shows, more spending sounds
great, but if it is not matched by additional income, then savings disappear or debt piles up.5
To this point, I have not talked about the elephant that sits in the middle of the government’s
budget. The biggest source of uncertainty that the government of Alberta must deal with has to
do with non-renewable resource royalties (NRR). So let’s talk about that next.
NRR AND THE BUDGET GAP
The effect of economic conditions on the government’s budget is especially acute in Alberta
because one of the government’s most important revenue sources — non-renewable resource
(NRR) revenues — is particularly volatile. In 1999, for example, the government received only
$2.4 billion in NRR revenues while two years later, in 2001, it was enjoying access to four
times that amount ($10.6 billion). That bounty was short-lived. A year later (in 2002) NRR
revenues had fallen by 40 per cent to $6.2 billion. NRR revenues in 2010 ($6.8 billion) are less
than half what they were in 2006 ($14.3 billion) but are expected, in turn, to be less than half
what the February 2012 budget predicts NRR revenues will be in 2015 ($16.0 billion). Clearly,
NRR revenues are much like that special girl or guy from our past: exciting, to be sure, but not
very reliable.
Remembering that any budget is based on what is only a best guess of what the future may
look like, the volatility of NRR means it poses a particularly daunting challenge for the
government. When households are faced with such a large and unpredictable source of income
they generally choose to avoid relying on that income to fund key expenditures like the
mortgage, food and the kids’ teeth. Instead what they do is form a best guess of what portion of
that income they can safely rely upon. They use that portion to fund the mortgage and pay for
groceries and braces. The rest, because it is too uncertain to be relied upon to fund such basic
expenditures, is usually saved. Those savings grow over time and spin off a more or less steady
stream in investment income; just the sort of income that can be relied upon to finance
important expenditures.6
5 Moving from the black to the blue to the red budgeting strategies can also involve cutting taxes without an offsetting
cut in spending. We come to the same conclusion: Lower taxes sound nice, but without a reduction in spending, debt
accumulates or savings disappear.
6 This reaction to uncertain income fits nicely with what economists believe is a rational way for households to
behave. The fact that households actually do behave in this way represents one of those few occasions when what
economists theorize must be true is actually observed in reality.
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If reacting to uncertain income in this way makes sense to households, then surely it must
make sense to governments as well. It certainly does in Norway. Like Albertans, the citizens of
Norway enjoy the benefits of owning substantial oil and gas deposits and, like Alberta, their
government collects large royalties from energy producers who drill and process that resource.
Like Alberta, Norway also suffers the problem of dealing with a large and volatile revenue
source. The Norwegians deal with this problem in the same way that I described how sensible
households behave: by saving that which they have found they cannot rely upon to fund
important programs such as health and education. Norway has plowed almost all of its non-
renewable resource revenue into eliminating debt and building a giant savings fund. It is for
this reason that the 4.9 million citizens of Norway control a savings fund worth about $600
billion.7
To try to get a handle on how much the government of Alberta relies on NRR, and the
implication of that reliance, I am going to adjust our budget accounting slightly and introduce a
new term. Let’s remind ourselves of what we derived earlier:
Deficit/Surplus = (Program Spending + Debt Service) 
— (Taxation + Federal Transfers + Investment Income + NRR).
I am going to remove from this accounting statement those budget categories that are
influenced by relying on NRR. The first thing to go, obviously, is NRR. Next, I am going to
assume that the size of Alberta’s savings funds — the largest of which are the Heritage and
Sustainability Funds — reflects deposits of NRR revenues into those funds. This means that
the Investment Income earned on those funds would not be available to fund spending were it
not for NRR revenues. By removing NRR and Investment Income from the budget statement
we get an idea of what life would be like for the government if it weaned itself off this volatile
source of revenue. The result is:
Deficit/Surplus = (Program Spending + Debt Service) — (Taxation + Federal Transfers).
Next, I am going to rename the term on the left-hand side because it no longer measures
exactly what it did before. Previously it measured the amount of borrowing or the amount of
dis-saving that needed to be done when total spending exceeded all sources of revenue,
including NRR and Investment Income. Now it measures something a bit different; it measures
the amount of borrowing or dis-saving that needs to be done when total spending exceeds the
revenue the government collects by way of just Taxation and Federal Transfers. In other words,
it measures the size of the Deficit/Surplus if the government were forced to save all NRR and
Investment Income revenues. Let me call that difference the Budget Gap.8 This gives us:
Budget Gap = (Program Spending + Debt Service) — (Taxation + Federal Transfers).
7 That works out to $120,000 per Norwegian. By way of comparison, 3.8 million Albertans control a total of between
$36 billion and $51 billion depending on how one counts these things. That works out to between $9,500 and
$13,400 per Albertan.
8 The government’s budget constraint can be re-arranged in all sorts of ways. The Alberta Financial Investment and
Planning Advisory Commission, which released its report to the government in December 2009, defined a variable it
called the “fiscal gap.” The fiscal gap was meant to identify the extent to which the government of Alberta relies on the
taxes it imposes on its own citizens. The fiscal gap differs from my budget gap mainly because the fiscal gap omits
Federal Transfers: the tax revenue the government of Alberta receives by way of federal taxes imposed on all Canadians. 
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The next figure uses data from Alberta government budgets to calculate the Budget Gap and
show how it has evolved since 1983. Because over time inflation causes spending and revenue
to grow, and because population growth requires that the government increase spending to
accommodate more kids in schools and more people in hospitals, I present the data in real per
capita dollars. This means I have removed the influence of inflation and I have presented the
size of the Budget Gap on a per-person basis.9 For example, the first dollar value shown in the
graph, representing the size of the Budget Gap in fiscal year 1987, indicates that for every man,
woman and child in Alberta, the provincial government spent $6,397 more than it raised in
taxes and received in the form of federal government transfers. 
THE BUDGET GAP
An important thing to notice about the Budget Gap is that it has always been greater than zero.
This means the government’s Total Spending has always exceeded what it collects from
Albertans by way of Taxation and receives from the federal government by way of Federal
Transfers. Were it not for NRR revenues and Investment Income, the government would
always have suffered very large budget deficits.10
The history of movements in the Budget Gap is interesting and suggestive of a close
relationship with NRR revenues. The first example of this was the precipitous reduction in the
size of the Budget Gap between 1987 ($6,397) and 1988 ($4,524). This was the response of the
government of premier Don Getty to the collapse of energy prices in 1987; a collapse that saw
the government lose over 60 per cent of the revenue it collected from that source and nearly
25 per cent of its total revenue. Although the Budget Gap was dramatically reduced, NRR
revenues were nowhere near enough to balance the budget and so the government began to
accumulate debt.11
9 I have used Alberta’s Consumer Price Index to adjust for inflation.
10 Norway tends to keep its Budget Gap close to zero. By doing so, it avoids relying on uncertain NRR revenues to
fund its spending on health, education and social services.
11 The Getty government had a choice: It could have reduced the Budget Gap still further with some combination of
spending cuts and tax increases, it could have accumulated debt or it could have dug into savings held in the Heritage

























































































As the figure shows, the Getty government hung on for a number of years, holding the Budget
Gap more or less constant, accumulating debt and hoping for a return to higher energy prices.
Energy prices did not recover and between 1985 and 1994, the government burned through $39
billion (measured in today’s dollars) because it failed to align its spending to its tax revenue
and close the budget gap.
The next big adjustment in the Budget Gap was introduced during the first government of
premier Ralph Klein. Elected on a platform calling for deep spending cuts, Klein did exactly
that and the Budget Gap was dramatically reduced from $4,278 in 1993 to $1,400 by 1999. At
$1,400 per person, the Budget Gap was now small enough that NRR revenues were more than
sufficient to fill it and indeed provided enough revenue that government could quickly retire
the debt accumulated during the Getty years.
Since 1999, the Budget Gap has been allowed to grow through a combination of tax cuts and,
mainly, spending increases. By 2011 it had grown to $3,910 per person; just short of the $4,278
gap that Ralph Klein inherited in 1993. The growth in the Gap parallels the growth in NRR
revenues between 1999 and 2006. Rapid growth in NRR revenues meant that the government
could seemingly afford rapid spending increases, but affordability was dependent on high
energy prices. When, in a repeat of history, energy price began to fall in 2006, NRR revenues
also fell. By 2010 NRR revenues were less than half what they were in 2006. The revenue
foundation for high spending was dramatically eroded and the government was faced with a
familiar choice: reduce the size of the Budget Gap with some combination of spending cuts or
tax increases, accumulate debt, or dig into savings. This time the government decided to dig
into savings. Between 2008 and 2012 the government reduced savings by $16.5 billion.12 The
average annual rate of burn of the government’s savings during this period — $4.1 billion per
year — is eerily similar to that during the Getty years — $4.3 billion per year.
INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING
The provincial government has recently suggested that spending on infrastructure should be
financed by borrowing as opposed to taxation. The idea is that spending on infrastructure is an
investment with returns to be enjoyed both now and in the future. To understand the logic of
this argument, think of spending on new roads, new schools and new hospitals. All of these
things will benefit individuals and private companies for decades. Is it fair that current
taxpayers be asked to pay the full cost of these expenditures? If future taxpayers also benefit
from these expenditures, we can cause them to pay their fair share by paying for these projects
with borrowed dollars rather than taxation. The accumulated debt can then be paid by
taxpayers in the future.
12 Measured in inflation-adjusted 2012 dollars. According to the February 2012 budget, the digging is expected to
continue until 2014, by which time, savings will have declined by more than $19.8 billion since 2008. Most analysts
believe this is a very optimistic assessment. In a publication released nearly four years ago, my colleague Herb
Emery and I forecasted that that digging would occur if the government did not reduce its dependence on non-
renewable resource revenues (see “Will it be Déjà Vu All Over Again?” School of Public Policy, Volume 2, Issue 1,
April 2009). We’re disappointed that we have been proven correct.
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This is a sensible argument and it is one that economists know as the so-called Golden Rule of
government borrowing. The idea is that over the course of a complete business cycle, the only
borrowing that should be done is for investment in social infrastructure. In terms of our earlier
graphic, applying the Golden Rule involves shifting the red wavy line down (by increasing
spending and/or reducing tax rates) so that the deficits incurred during periods of slower-than-
normal growth exceed the surpluses enjoyed during faster-than-normal growth. At the end of
the business cycle, then, the government has more debt than when it started.
While the Golden Rule seems eminently sensible, it’s a bit slippery in its application. What
exactly do we mean by “social infrastructure”? Roads and hospitals seem like good bets, but
how about the cost of hiring teachers to educate our children? Today’s well-educated kids will
surely benefit future taxpayers, so shouldn’t future taxpayers share in the cost of hiring today’s
teachers? How about moving people out of poverty so their children have a better opportunity
to contribute to society? Surely that is a worthwhile investment that is more than comparable
to, say, the cost of a new road. 
Economists have suggested that one way of defining the spending that should be financed with
borrowing is to measure the rate of return on that spending. That is, financing infrastructure
with borrowing is justified if the rate of return on that spending exceeds the rate of return that
would have been earned had that borrowed money been left in the private sector. That helps
our thinking on this issue a bit, perhaps, but leaves us with the tricky question of identifying
the rate of return on public projects. What, for example, is the rate of return on ending poverty? 
In order to limit the temptation for governments to forever broaden the definition of public
infrastructure, applications of the Golden Rule are often associated with a limit on the size of
the annual deficit and the level of public indebtedness. If the government of Alberta were to
adopt a Golden Rule, it would be good to know how it intends to define social infrastructure
and what limits it might place on the amount it intends to borrow for that purpose. But before
going there, there is another issue that needs to be considered, and once again it arises because
of non-renewable resource revenues (NRR). 
Albertans share ownership of oil and gas deposits; what you might think of as a capital asset.
In partnership with private industry, Albertans, whose interests are represented by the
provincial government, turn these oil and gas deposits into financial assets in the form of
royalty payments. Economists have long advocated that the government save these royalty
payments as a way of ensuring our capital asset never disappears. Saving royalty payments
means the capital asset is changed from oil and gas in the ground to dollars in a savings fund.
In this way, an asset in finite supply is turned into an asset that need never be depleted and can
forever spin off investment income.
Despite this advice, since 1983 the government has arguably saved only eight per cent of
NRR.13 For the past five years, not a penny of NRR can be claimed to have been saved and
indeed, as noted earlier, savings have been rapidly eaten up. 
13 This is calculated by taking the change in the value of net financial assets between 1983 and 2012 ($14.1 billion) as a
percentage of the sum of all NRR received by the government over that same period ($176 billion). 
What does it mean when the government does not save NRR? It means it is depleting capital,
leaving less for future generations. Put differently, it means the government is asking future
Alberta taxpayers to pay for today’s spending. By the Golden Rule, that is legitimate so long as
the amount of today’s spending paid for with NRR and with borrowing is roughly comparable
to the benefits future generations will enjoy thanks to today’s spending. 
How are we doing on that score? To try to get a handle on this, I’ll start by calculating how
much of today’s spending the government is asking future generations of Albertans to pay for.
Between 1998 and 2012, an average of 21 per cent of our provincial government’s Total
Spending was funded by borrowing from future generations of taxpayers. This average hides a
steady growth in the fraction of total spending paid for by borrowing from future taxpayers. In
1998, borrowing represented only seven per cent of total spending while in 2012 it represented
32 per cent. 
I dare say that few analysts would feel comfortable suggesting that 32 per cent of provincial
government spending is going towards goods and services that will mainly benefit only future
generations of taxpayers. If, perhaps, seven per cent is more like it, then the government —
and Alberta taxpayers — have some hard decisions to make about cutting spending, raising
additional tax dollars, or some combination of the two.14
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Understanding what our governments are doing with respect to budgets is made easier if we
relate their choices to those we must make with respect to our own finances. We must pay our
bills so that when spending exceeds income we can either borrow, and go into debt, or we can
dig into savings. Borrowing or digging into savings are not very different from one another; the
former means we pay interest on our debt while the latter means we forego investment income.
Once we get our spending and income into balance, we tend to maintain that balance. Any new
spending is matched by new income so that the gap between spending and income remains
constant. We do not rely on income that is high one month and low the next to fund important
family expenditures. Spending on infrastructure (a house, for example) is an investment that
can sensibly be financed with borrowing. However we put limits on the size of that debt and
we are careful about the things we pay for with borrowing. In particular, we don’t ask our
children to pay for groceries by borrowing and passing the debt to them. I have tried to show in
this note that the government faces these very same issues and choices. 
14 Interestingly, seven per cent of total provincial government spending in 2012 was equal to about one per cent of
Alberta’s GDP. The Alberta Financial Management Commission
(http://www.finance.alberta.ca/publications/other/2002_0708_fmc_final_report.pdf), appointed by the government in
2002 to offer advice on budgeting choices, suggested that the government annually spend 0.9 per cent of GDP on
infrastructure projects. 
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My description of the budgeting problem suggests there are three key questions that should be
posed to our government and to any political party seeking to represent our interests as our
government:
1. How tolerant are they of annual deficits? Do they advocate a strategy of relatively lower
levels of government spending and/or higher tax rates, so as to avoid deficits no matter the
state of the economy? Or will they tolerate deficits during economic slowdowns to enable
higher levels of spending and/or lower tax rates?
2. To what extent are they willing to trust the payment of health-care costs and the costs of
education and social assistance to oil and gas royalties as opposed to taxation?
3. How, exactly, does one define investments in social infrastructure; investments that can be
funded by borrowing or by spending non-renewable resource royalties? What limits should
be put on borrowing to fund such expenditures?
The answers to these questions are contentious. They are contentious because they involve
trade-offs that are required by the government’s budget constraint. But all governments must
answer these questions and, so, must make these choices. Nor are there necessarily any correct
answers to these questions. What I deem to be a correct answer will reflect my preferences and
what you deem to be correct will reflect yours. There is room for disagreement. We are
fortunate in that we live in a country that allows disagreements to be voiced and debated and
finally resolved in a peaceful democratic vote. A good result is only possible, however, if the
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